five to seven knots.
During these six months, though the admiral paid frequent visits to
the fleet off Mobile, the immediate direction of affairs was left to
the divisional commander, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, of the
Richmond. In the last week of July, however, Farragut took charge in
person, and sent the Richmond, and others of the blockading force that
were to attempt the entry of the bay, to Pensacola to complete their
preparations. The Manhattan had arrived on the 20th and the Chickasaw
came in from New Orleans on the 1st of August. These, with the
Winnebago, were anchored under the lee of Sand Island; but the
Tecumseh did not get down until the Richmond, with the others,
returned on the night of the 4th; and it was only by the untiring
efforts of her commander and Captain Jenkins that she was ready even
then. With her, and the return of the blockaders, the admiral's force
was complete.
The understanding with General Granger, in immediate command of the
troops, was that he should land on the 4th on Dauphin Island and
invest Gaines, as he had not men enough to attack both forts at once.
The admiral was to pass Morgan and enter the bay the same morning.
Granger landed, but Farragut could not fulfil his part of the bargain,
because so many of his ships were still away. The delay, though he
chafed under it, was in the end an advantage, as the enemy used that
last day of his control of the water to throw more troops into Gaines,
who were all taken two days later.
In forming his plan of attack the admiral wanted two favors from
nature; a westerly wind to blow the smoke from the fleet and toward
Morgan, and a flood-tide. In regular summer weather the wind from
sunrise till eight o'clock is light from the southward and then hauls
gradually round to the west and northwest, growing in strength as it
does so. The tide was a matter of calculation, if no exceptional wind
modified its direction. The admiral wished it flood for two reasons:
first, because, as he intended to go in at any cost, it would help a
crippled ship into the harbor; and secondly, he had noticed that the
primers of the barrel-torpedoes were close together on top, and
thought it likely that when the flood-tide straightened out their
mooring-lines the tops would be turned away from the approaching
ships.
As at New Orleans, the preparations were left very much to the
commanders of ships. A general order directed spare spars and boats to
be landed, t
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