in these physical
sciences, however, have changed that, and the modern psychologist has
to begin by being a physiologist and anatomist.

"Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case,
nowadays, doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the
physiology of the nervous system. What we call the operations of
the mind are the functions of the brain, and the materials of
consciousness are products of cerebral activity. Cabanis may have
made use of crude and misleading phraseology when he said that
the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; but the
conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is,
nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular
notion that the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head,
but as independent of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his
instrument. It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine
just laid down is what is commonly called materialism. I am not
sure that the adjective 'crass,' which appears to have a special
charm for rhetorical sciolists, would not be applied to it. But
it is, nevertheless, true that the doctrine contains nothing
inconsistent with the purest idealism."

The whole doctrine of evolution is similarly a materialistic account
of natural phenomena, in the popular and not the philosophical meaning
of the term. But even within this popular meaning, it is extremely
necessary to have an exact conception of the limits within which
Huxley was materialistic. Take for instance the question of the origin
of life. It would be one of the greatest achievements of physical
science could it shew that life was not inco-ordinate with non-living
physical phenomena, but was a special case of them. Huxley knew that
this advance had not yet been made.

"It may be that, by-and-by, philosophers will discover some
higher laws of which the facts of life are particular cases--very
possibly they will find out some bond between physico-chemical
phenomena on the one hand, and vital phenomena on the other. At
present, however, we assuredly know of none; and I think we shall
exercise a wise humility in confessing that, for us at least,
this successive assumption of different states (external
conditions remaining the same)--this spontaneity of action--if I
may use a term which implies more than I would be answerable