he time the highest law officer of the crown,
he had committed a grave offence, and was justly liable to the full
penalties of the broken statute. He had received the royal permission, but
it was a plea which could not have availed him, and he did not attempt to
urge it.[288] The contingency of a possible violation of the law by the
king himself had been expressly foreseen and provided against in the act
under which he was prosecuted,[289] and being himself the king's legal
adviser, it was his duty to have kept his sovereign[290] informed of the
true nature of the statute. He had neglected this, his immediate
obligation, in pursuit of the interests of the church, and when Henry's
eyes were opened, he did not consider himself called upon to interfere to
shield his minister from the penalties which he had incurred, nor is it
likely that in the face of the irritation of the country he could have done
so if he had desired. It was felt, indeed, that the long services of
Wolsey, and his generally admirable administration, might fairly save him
(especially under the circumstances of the case) from extremity of
punishment; and if he had been allowed to remain unmolested in the affluent
retirement which was at first conceded to him, his treatment would not have
caused the stain which we have now to lament on the conduct of the
administration which succeeded his fall. He indeed himself believed that
the final attack upon him was due to no influence of rival statesmen, but
to the hatred of Anne Boleyn; and perhaps he was not mistaken. This,
however, is a matter which does not concern us here, and I need not pursue
it. It is enough that he had violated the law of England, openly and
knowingly, and on the revival of the national policy by which that law had
been enacted, he reaped the consequences in his own person.

It will be a question whether we can equally approve of the enlarged
application of the statute which immediately followed. The guilt of Wolsey
did not rest with himself; it extended to all who had recognised him in his
capacity of legate; to the archbishops and bishops, to the two Houses of
Convocation, to the Privy Council, to the Lords and Commons, and indirectly
to the nation itself. It was obvious that such a state of things was not
contemplated by the act under which he was tried, and where in point of law
all persons were equally guilty, in equity they were equally innocent; the
circumstances of the case, therefore