proceedings; but let me, as an old man, who ought by this
time to have profited by experience, say that when I was younger I found
I often misinterpreted the intentions of people, and found they did not
mean what at the time I supposed they meant; and, further, that as a
general rule, it was better to be a little dull of apprehension where
phrases seemed to imply pique, and quick in perception when, on the
contrary, they seemed to imply kindly feeling. The real truth never
fails ultimately to appear; and opposing parties, if wrong, are sooner
convinced when replied to forbearingly, than when overwhelmed. All
I mean to say is, that it is better to be blind to the results of
partisanship, and quick to see good will. One has more happiness in
oneself in endeavouring to follow the things that make for peace. You
can hardly imagine how often I have been heated in private when opposed,
as I have thought, unjustly and superciliously, and yet I have striven,
and succeeded, I hope, in keeping down replies of the like kind. And I
know I have never lost by it. I would not say all this to you did I not
esteem you as a true philosopher and friend.[1]

'Yours, very truly,

'M. Faraday.'

Footnote to Chapter 4

[1] Faraday would have been rejoiced to learn that, during
its last meeting at Dundee, the British Association
illustrated in a striking manner the function which he here
describes as its principal one. In my own case, a brotherly
welcome was everywhere manifested. In fact, the differences
of really honourable and sane men are never beyond healing.

Chapter 5.

Identity of electricities; first researches on
electro-chemistry.

I have already once used the word 'discomfort' in reference to the
occasional state of Faraday's mind when experimenting. It was to him a
discomfort to reason upon data which admitted of doubt. He hated what he
called 'doubtful knowledge,' and ever tended either to transfer it
into the region of undoubtful knowledge, or of certain and definite
ignorance. Pretence of all kinds, whether in life or in philosophy, was
hateful to him. He wished to know the reality of our nescience as well
as of our science. 'Be one thing or the other,' he seemed to say to
an unproved hypothesis; 'come out as a solid truth, or disappear as a
convicted lie.' After making the great discovery which I have attempted
to describe, a doubt seemed to beset him as regards the ide