t on the sea. Much of their territory is occupied.
They did not seek the war; they still lack co-ordination and leadership
in waging it. In some of these countries, at least, politicians and
statesmen are so absorbed by administrative duties, by national rather
than international problems, by the effort to sustain themselves, that
they have little time for allied strategy. Governments rise and fall,
familiar names and reputations are juggled about like numbered balls in a
shaker, come to the top to be submerged again in a new 'emeute'. There
are conferences and conferences without end. Meanwhile a social ferment
is at work, in Russia conspicuously, in Italy a little less so, in
Germany and Austria undoubtedly, in France and England, and even in our
own country--once of the most radical in the world, now become the most
conservative.
What form will the social revolution take? Will it be unbridled,
unguided; will it run through a long period of anarchy before the
fermentation begun shall have been completed, or shall it be handled, in
all the nations concerned, by leaders who understand and sympathize with
the evolutionary trend, who are capable of controlling it, of taking the
necessary international steps of co-operation in order that it may become
secure and mutually beneficial to all? This is an age of co-operation,
and in this at least, if not in other matters, the United States of
America is in an ideal position to assume the leadership.
To a certain extent, one is not prepared to say how far, the military and
social crises are interdependent. And undoubtedly the military problem
rests on the suppression of the submarine. If Germany continues to
destroy shipping on the seas, if we are not able to supply our new armies
and the Allied nations with food and other things, the increasing social
ferment will paralyze the military operations of the Entente. The result
of a German victory under such circumstances is impossible to predict;
but the chances are certainly not worth running. In a, sense, therefore,
in a great sense, the situation is "up" to us in more ways than one, not
only to supply wise democratic leadership but to contribute material aid
and brains in suppressing the submarine, and to build ships enough to
keep Britain, France, and Italy from starving. We are looked upon by all
the Allies, and I believe justly, as being a disinterested nation, free
from the age-long jealousies of Europe. And w
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