d much more favourable to his defence.

On the morning of the 1st of July the expedition arrived off the coast of
Africa, and the column of Septimus-Severus pointed out to us the city of
Alexandria. Our situation and frame of mind hardly permitted us to
reflect that in the distant point we beheld the city of the Ptolemies and
Caesars, with its double port, its pharos, and the gigantic monuments of
its ancient grandeur. Our imaginations did not rise to this pitch.

Admiral Brueys had sent on before the frigate Juno to fetch M. Magallon,
the French Consul. It was near four o'clock when he arrived, and the sea
was very rough. He informed the General-in-Chief that Nelson had been
off Alexandria on the 28th--that he immediately dispatched a brig to
obtain intelligence from the English agent. On the return of the brig
Nelson instantly stood away with his squadron towards the north-east.
But for a delay which our convoy from Civita Vecchia occasioned, we
should have been on this coast at the same time as Nelson.

It appeared that Nelson supposed us to be already at Alexandria when he
arrived there. He had reason to suppose so, seeing that we left Malta on
the 19th of June, whilst he did not sail from Messina till the 21st.
Not finding us where he expected, and being persuaded we ought to have
arrived there had Alexandria been the place of our destination; he sailed
for Alexandretta in Syria, whither he imagined we had gone to effect a
landing. This error saved the expedition a second time.

Bonaparte, on hearing the details which the French Consul communicated,
resolved to disembark immediately. Admiral Brueys represented the
difficulties and dangers of a disembarkation--the violence of the surge,
the distance from the coast,--a coast, too, lined with reefs of rocks,
the approaching night, and our perfect ignorance of the points suitable
for landing. The Admiral, therefore, urged the necessity of waiting till
next morning; that is to say, to delay the landing twelve hours. He
observed that Nelson could not return from Syria for several days.
Bonaparte listened to these representations with impatience and
ill-humour. He replied peremptorily, "Admiral, we have no time to lose.
Fortune gives me but three days; if I do not profit by them we are lost."
He relied much on fortune; this chimerical idea constantly influenced his
resolutions.

Bonaparte having the command of the naval as well as the military force,
the Admiral was o