its greatest strength it was less than half the
opposing cavalry force.

Rosecrans' future base of operations was Nashville, but he would be
dependent for supplies upon the maintenance of the railroad to Louisville.
He hastened to increase the garrison of Nashville, but could not for some
time concentrate there owing to the destruction of a railway tunnel near
Mitchellsville, which limited him to wagon transportation over bad roads
for thirty-five miles. The railway was opened November 26th, and the army
was then concentrated near Nashville, with the exception of Reynolds'
division and all but one brigade of Fry's, which were assigned the duty of
protecting the railway.

Before advancing it was absolutely essential to place in Nashville a large
supply of rations, ammunition, etc., sufficient to support the army during
the longest probable break in the railway, as a result of the forays of
the rebel cavalry. This required an entire month, and the administration
was greatly dissatisfied at the long delay. Rosecrans went through an
experience very similar to that suffered by Thomas at the same place later
in the war. But to the threats to relieve him he made the blunt reply that
if confidence did not exist he was perfectly ready to turn over the
command and abide by the issue. Halleck then explained that it was not
intended to threaten him, but that there was great anxiety in Washington
over the slow course of events in Tennessee. He explained that this arose
from diplomatic reasons. It had been greatly desired that a decided
advantage be gained over the rebels before the opening of the British
Parliament, otherwise the advocates of intervention in favor of the
Confederacy would be able to point to the possession of Tennessee as a
proof that the South was gaining on the North. It would seem, however,
that this was only one of the long series of attempts by Halleck to run
the war from an office in Washington--a course that never did and never
could result in any good.

Rosecrans continued his preparations carefully, and Bragg concluded that
he was going into winter quarters at Nashville. Bragg therefore placed his
army in winter quarters at Murfreesboro' and vicinity, and detached his
cavalry for operations in West Tennessee and against the railway in
Kentucky. This was just what Rosecrans wanted. He wanted Bragg to draw
near to Nashville so that his own line of communications might be short
and a reverse less disastrous