ain, he would be forced to make great
detachments to guard Nashville and his lines of communications, since
these would be especially open to the attack of the enemy, who was well
known to be superior in cavalry.

Buell considered Nashville the vital point of the theatre, and was
satisfied that it would be the main point of Bragg's attack. He therefore
ignored Halleck's elaborate plan and set about repairing the railway to
Nashville and moving his troops in that direction. His previous slowness
and indecision had brought him greatly into disfavor, and on the 30th of
October he was relieved by Major-General William S. Rosecrans. The
district was called thereafter the Department of the Cumberland and the
army in the field was designated as the Fourteenth Army Corps. Halleck's
plans were urged upon Rosecrans, but he was of the same opinion as Buell,
and it had by that time become plain that Bragg was doing just what Buell
thought he would do. Rosecrans concluded to go on in the same direction as
had Buell, and the events showed clearly that Halleck's bureau-made plans,
based upon theory alone and without an intimate knowledge of the real
conditions, were the veriest nonsense, and that Buell and Rosecrans were
quite right in ignoring them.

Rosecrans organized the army into right wing, center, and left wing. The
right wing, under McCook, consisted of Johnson's, Davis's, and Sheridan's
divisions. Thomas commanded the center, which consisted of five divisions
under Rousseau, Negley, Fry, Mitchell, and Reynolds. The left wing was
commanded by Crittenden, and comprised Wood's, Palmer's, and Van Cleve's
divisions. The total available strength of the army formed not more than
60 per cent. of its paper strength, owing to absenteeism. Every endeavor
was made to remedy this state of affairs, a condition not peculiar to this
army alone, but affecting all the armies almost equally, and constituting
a serious evil, for the correction of which severe measures were an
absolute necessity.

The army was very deficient in cavalry, and a large portion of its meagre
force was very poorly armed. In this condition the army was at a great
disadvantage opposed to Bragg, whose cavalry, under Forrest, Morgan, and
Wheeler was much greater in numbers and better mounted and equipped.

Rosecrans made strenuous efforts to improve the condition of his cavalry,
and succeeded in increasing it to about 4,000 and in obtaining Stanley to
command it. But at