tible of decision by the application of
principles of law or equity," thereby recognizing the judicial nature
of arbitration. The action of the Senate, however, which sustained the
opinion of the majority report of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, objecting to the last clause of Article III of the
treaty,[2] would indicate that the significance of a general
arbitration treaty attaches not so much to the definition of its scope
as to who shall determine what cases conform to the definition. It
would seem that the nature of the reservation is relatively
unimportant so long as its interpretation devolves upon the parties at
variance. The majority report, objecting to the delegation to the
joint high commission of the power to determine the arbitrability of
cases in terms of the treaty, contains this statement[3] in which the
minority report likewise concurs: "Every one agrees that there are
certain questions which no nation ... will ever submit to the decision
of any one else." As cases of this nature it enumerates territorial
integrity, admission of immigrants, and our Monroe Doctrine. The
significance of this insistence upon a means of evasion is evident.
There is not yet enough international confidence. The powers are not
yet ready to submit to unlimited arbitration.

[2] The clause, referring to the commission of inquiry,
reads:

"It is further agreed, however, that in cases in
which the Parties disagree as to whether or not a
difference is subject to arbitration under Article I
of this Treaty, that question shall be submitted to
the Joint High Commission of Inquiry; and if all or
all but one of the members of the Commission agree
and report that such difference is within the scope
of Article I, it shall be referred to arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of this
treaty."--_Editor._

[3] See Senate Document 98, 62d Cong., 1st Sess.,
9-10.--_Editor._

The other enemy to rational judgment--and rational judgment must be
the only basis of arbitration--is the danger of emotionalism. The
average man is yet largely irrational. When cool and self-possessed,
and when his prejudices and traditions do not interfere, he can pass
rational judgment upon questions in which his own interests are not
concerned; but when his passions are aroused he dispenses with any
effort to reason and acts in obedience to blind im