them from the writers.
Suzanelli thenceforth communicated all news relative to the movements of
old Queen Caroline, and the British in the Mediterranean. Sir Hudson
Lowe's confidence in Suzanelli was so much increased by the apparently
important communications which the Neapolitan police had purposely made
to him, that he rewarded him profusely, and at length accepted his offer
of furnishing recruits to the Corsican legion at Capri. When the
garrison was corrupted through the medium of those recruits, and an
expedition was prepared at Naples, Suzanelli, in order to hoodwink the
governor of Capri, whose vigilance might be awakened by the
preparations, sent him a detailed report of the strength and object of
the expedition, but telling him that it was meant to attack the Isle of
Ponza. The expedition, under General La Marque, sailed at night, and the
French effected their landing by surprise. The Royal Maltese regiment
contained a great number of Suzanelli's recruits. They laid down their
arms, and surrendered the forts in their charge. The commandant
succeeded with difficulty in shutting himself up in the citadel with the
royal Corsican regiment. It was inaccessible by assault, but the French
dragged some heavy guns to a commanding height, and after a cannonade
the garrison capitulated.

This story is not exactly true; for the capitulation was _not_ the
result of the cannonade; but water and provisions had totally failed.
The attempt made by an English frigate to succour the island had been
frustrated by a violent gale, and there was no resource but to give up
the island. Yet, if our memory is exact, there was _no_ capitulation;
for the garrison escaped without laying down their arms.

It is proverbial, that great events frequently depend upon very little
causes. All the world now blames the precipitancy of Napoleon in leaving
Elba while the Congress was assembled. If he had waited until it was
dissolved, he would have gained all the time which must have been lost
by the Allies in reuniting their councils. The princes and diplomatists
would have been scattered; the armies would have marched homewards;
months would probably have elapsed before they could again have been
brought into the field; and during that period, there would have been
full opportunity for all the arts of intrigue and insinuation, which
Napoleon so well knew how to use. Or, if he had delayed his return for a
twelvemonth longer, he would have only fou