unicate unto you.

The first was to obey the lawes and customes of my Country, constantly
adhaering to that Religion wherein by the grace of God I had from mine
infancy bin bred. And in all other things behaving my self according to
the most moderate opinions and those which were farthest from excesse,
which were commonly received in practice by the most judicious Men,
amongst whom I was to live: For beginning from that very time, to reckon
mine own for nothing, because I could bring them all to the test, I was
confident I could not do better then follow those of the deepest sense;
and although perhaps there are as understanding men amongst the Persians
or Chineses as amongst us, yet I thought it was more fit to regulate my
self by those with whom I was to live, and that I might truly know what
their opinions were, I was rather to observe what they practic'd, then
what they taught. Not only by reason of the corruption of our manners,
there are but few who will say, all they beleeve, but also because
divers are themselves ignorant of it; for the act of the thought by
which we beleeve a thing, being different from that whereby we know that
we believe it, the one often is without the other. And amongst divers
opinions equally receiv'd, I made choise of the most moderate only, as
well because they are always the most fit for practice, and probably the
best, all excess being commonly ill; As also that I might less err from
the right way, if I should perhaps miss it, then if having chosen one of
the extremes, it might prove to be the other, which I should have
followed. And particularly I plac'd amongst extremities, all those
promises by which we somwhat restrain our liberty. Not that I
disapproved the laws, which to cure the inconstancy of weak minds,
permit us when we have any good design, or else for the preservation of
Commerce, one that is but indifferent, to make vows or contracts, which
oblige us to persevere in them: But because I saw nothing in the world
remain always in the same state; and forming own particular, promised my
self to perfect more and more my judgment, and not to impair it, I
should have thought my self guilty of a great fault against right
understanding, if because I then approved any thing, I were also
afterwards oblig'd to take it for good, when perhaps it ceased to be so,
or that I had ceased to esteem it so.

My second Maxime was, To be the most constant and resolute in my actions
that I could;