subject to fail, and do never almost trust my
first thoughts; yet the experience I have of the objections which may be
made unto me, hinder me from hoping for any profit from them; For I have
often tried the judgments as well of those whom I esteem'd my friends,
as of others whom I thought indifferent, and even also of some, whose
malignity and envie did sufficiently discover what the affection of my
friends might hide. But it seldom happened that any thing was objected
against me, which I had not altogether foreseen, unless it were very
remote from my Subject: So that I never almost met with any Censurer of
my opinions, that seemed unto me either less rigorous, or less equitable
then my self. Neither did I ever observe, that by the disputations
practiced in the Schools any Truth which was formerly unknown, was ever
discovered. For whilest every one seeks to overcome, men strive more to
maintain probabilities, then to weigh the reasons on both sides; and
those who for a long time have been good Advocates, are not therefore
the better Judges afterwards.

As for the benefit which others may receive from the communication of my
thoughts, it cannot also be very great, forasmuch as I have not yet
perfected them, but that it is necessary to add many things thereunto,
before a usefull application can be made of them. And I think I may say
without vanity, That if there be any one capable thereof, it must be my
self, rather then any other. Not but that there may be divers wits in
the world incomparably better then mine; but because men cannot so well
conceive a thing and make it their own, when they learn it of another,
as when they invent it themselves: which is so true in this Subject,
that although I have often explain'd some of my opinions to very
understanding men, and who, whilest I spake to them, seem'd very
distinctly to conceive them; yet when they repeated them, I observ'd,
that they chang'd them almost always in such a manner, that I could no
longer own them for mine. Upon which occasion, I shall gladly here
desire those who come after me, never to beleeve those things which may
be delivered to them for mine, when I have not published them my self.
And I do not at all wonder at the extravagancies which are attributed to
all those ancient Philosophers, whose Writings we have not; neither do I
thereby judge, that their thoughts were very irrationall, seeing they
were the best Wits of their time; but onely that they have