t towards, things future, except only instinctive and
compelled?

25. The fact is, that it is not in intellect added to the bodily sense,
nor in moral sentiment superadded to the intellect, that the essential
difference between brute and man consists: but in the elevation of all
three to that point at which each becomes capable of communion with the
Deity, and worthy therefore of eternal life;--the body more universal as
an instrument--more exquisite in its sense--this last character carried
out in the eye and ear to the perception of Beauty, in form, sound, and
color--and herein distinctively raised above the brutal sense;
intellect, as we have said, peculiarly separating and vast; the moral
sentiments like in essence, but boundlessly expanded, as attached to an
infinite object, and laboring in an infinite field: each part mortal in
its shortcoming, immortal in the accomplishment of its perfection and
purpose; the opposition which we at first broadly expressed as between
body and spirit, being more strictly between the natural and spiritual
condition of the entire creature--body natural, sown in death, body
spiritual, raised in incorruption: Intellect natural, leading to
skepticism; intellect spiritual, expanding into faith: Passion natural,
suffered from things spiritual; passion spiritual, centered on things
unseen: and the strife or antagonism which is throughout the subject of
Lord Lindsay's proof, is not, as he has stated it, between the moral,
intellectual, and sensual elements, but between the upward and downward
tendencies of all three--between the spirit of Man which goeth upward,
and the spirit of the Beast which goeth downward.

26. We should not have been thus strict in our examination of these
preliminary statements, if the question had been one of terms merely, or
if the inaccuracy of thought had been confined to the Essay on
Antagonism. If upon receiving a writer's terms of argument in the
sense--however unusual or mistaken--which he chooses they should bear,
we may without further error follow his course of thought, it is as
unkind as unprofitable to lose the use of his result in quarrel with its
algebraic expression; and if the reader will understand by Lord
Lindsay's general term "Spirit" the susceptibility of right moral
emotion, and the entire subjection of the Will to Reason; and receive
his term "Sense" as not including the perception of Beauty either in
sight or sound, but expressive of animal s