ich I have been extolling?
Does it not reverse the principle of the division of labour? will
practical objects be obtained better or worse by its cultivation? to what
then does it lead? where does it end? what does it do? how does it profit?
what does it promise? Particular sciences are respectively the basis of
definite arts, which carry on to results tangible and beneficial the
truths which are the subjects of the knowledge attained; what is the Art
of this science of sciences? what is the fruit of such a Philosophy? what
are we proposing to effect, what inducements do we hold out to the
Catholic community, when we set about the enterprise of founding a
University?

I am asked what is the end of University Education, and of the Liberal or
Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart: I answer, that what
I have already said has been sufficient to show that it has a very
tangible, real, and sufficient end, though the end cannot be divided from
that knowledge itself. Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is
the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be
really such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it
is true also of that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a
comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of
science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values.
What the worth of such an acquirement is, compared with other objects
which we seek,--wealth or power or honour or the conveniences and comforts
of life, I do not profess here to discuss; but I would maintain, and mean
to show, that it is an object, in its own nature so really and undeniably
good, as to be the compensation of a great deal of thought in the
compassing, and a great deal of trouble in the attaining.

Now, when I say that Knowledge is, not merely a means to something beyond
it, or the preliminary of certain arts into which it naturally resolves,
but an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake, surely I
am uttering no paradox, for I am stating what is both intelligible in
itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the
ordinary feeling of mankind. I am saying what at least the public opinion
of this day ought to be slow to deny, considering how much we have heard
of late years, in opposition to Religion, of entertaining, curious, and
various knowledge. I am but saying what whole volumes have