hen a section of the community succeeds by its noisy vigour in
creating the impression that it voices the universal will. But, on the
whole, it works out justly. Ethical standards differ in different places
at different times. They are, indeed, always changing. Therefore, in
regard to all matters which belong to the sphere of what we commonly
call morals, there are in every community some who approve of a given
act, others who disapprove of it, yet others who regard it with
indifference. In such a shifting sphere we cannot legislate with the
certainty of carrying the whole community with us, nor can we properly
introduce the word "crime," which ought to indicate only an action of so
gravely anti-social nature that there can be no possibility of doubt
about it.

It is, however, important to understand the marked national differences
in the reaction to these slightly or dubiously anti-social acts, for
such differences rest on ancient tradition, and are to some extent the
expression of the genius of a people, though they are not the absolutely
immutable product of racial constitution, and, within limits, they
undergo transformation. It thus happens that acts which in some
countries are pursued by the law and punished as crime, are in other
countries untouched by the law, and left to the social reaction of the
community. It becomes, therefore, of some importance to compare national
differences in the attitude towards immorality, to find out whether the
attempt to repress it directly, by law, is more effective, or less
effective, than the method of leaving it to social reaction.

In many respects France and Germany present a remarkable contrast in
their respective methods of dealing with immorality. The contrast has
only existed since the sweeping legal reforms which followed the
Revolution in France. In old France the laws against sexual and
religious offences were extremely severe, involving in some cases death
at the stake, and even during the eighteenth century this extreme
penalty of the law was sometimes carried out. The police were active,
their methods of investigation elaborate and thorough, yet the rigour of
the law and the energy of the police signally failed to suppress
irreligion and immorality in eighteenth-century France. The Revolution,
by popularizing the opinions of the more enlightened men of the time,
and by giving to the popular voice an authority it had never possessed
before, remoulded the antiquated