submit to the decision
of a legal majority, be deemed a sovereign vote? Assuming that the whole
power of the Government of the United States were in the Senate, would
any one State be sovereign in such a condition of things? We think not.
But the Senate does not constitute by any means the whole or the half of
the authority of this Government; its legislative power is divided with
a popular body, without the concurrence of which it can do nothing; this
dilutes the sovereignty to a degree that renders it very imperceptible,
if not very absurd. Nor is this all. After a law is passed by the
concurrence of the two houses of Congress, it is sent to a perfectly
independent tribunal to decide whether it is in conformity with the
principles of the great national compact; thus demonstrating, as we
assume, that the sovereignty of this whole country rests, not in its
people, not in its States, but in the Government of the Union.

'Sovereignty, and that of the most absolute character, is indispensable
to the right of secession: nay, sovereignty, in the ordinary acceptation
of the meaning of the term, might exist in a State without this right of
secession. We doubt if it would be held sound doctrine to maintain that
any single State had a right to secede from the German Confederation,
for instance; and many alliances, or mere treaties, are held to be
sacred and indissoluble; they are only broken by an appeal to violence.

'Every human contract may be said to possess its distinctive character.
Thus, marriage is to be distinguished from a partnership in trade,
without recurrence to any particular form of words. Marriage, contracted
by any ceremony whatever, is held to be a contract for life. The same is
true of Governments: in their nature they are intended to be
indissoluble. We doubt if there be an instance on record of a Government
that ever existed, under conditions, expressed or implied, that the
parts of its territory might separate at will. There are so many
controlling and obvious reasons why such a privilege should not remain
in the hands of sections or districts, that it is unnecessary to advert
to them. But after a country has rounded its territory, constructed its
lines of defence, established its system of custom houses, and made all
the other provisions for security, convenience, and concentration, that
are necessary to the affairs of a great nation, it would seem to be very
presumptuous to impute to any particular dist