00 by a mystically vague compact with the Pope, was never a close bond
of union, even in his stern and able hands. Under his weak successors
that imposing league rarely promoted peace among its peoples, while the
splendour of its chief elective dignity not seldom conduced to war.
Next, feudalism came in as a strong political solvent, and thus for
centuries Germany crumbled and mouldered away, until disunion seemed to
be the fate of her richest lands, and particularism became a rooted
instinct of her princes, burghers, and peasants. Then again South was
arrayed against North during and long after the time of the Reformation;
when the strife of creeds was stayed, the rivalry of the Houses of
Hapsburg and Hohenzollern added another cause of hatred.

As a matter of fact, it was reserved for the two Napoleons, uncle and
nephew, to force those divided peoples to comradeship in arms. The close
of the campaign of 1813 and that of 1814 saw North and South, Prussians
and Austrians, for the first time fighting heartily shoulder to shoulder
in a great war--for that of 1792-94 had only served to show their rooted
suspicion and inner hostility. Owing to reasons that cannot be stated
here, the peace of 1814-15 led up to no effective union: it even
perpetuated the old dualism of interests. But once more the hostility of
France under a Napoleon strengthened the impulse to German
consolidation, and on this occasion there was at hand a man who had
carefully prepared the way for an abiding form of political union; his
diplomatic campaign of the last seven years had secured Russia's
friendship and consequently Austria's reluctant neutrality; as for the
dislike of the Southern States to unite with the North, that feeling
waned for a few weeks amidst the enthusiasm caused by the German
triumphs. The opportunity was unexampled: it had not occurred even in
1814; it might never occur again; and it was certain to pass away when
the war fever passed by. How wise, then, to strike while the iron was
hot! The smaller details of the welding process were infinitely less
important than the welding itself.

One last consideration remains. If the opportunity was unexampled, so
also were the statesmanlike qualities of the man who seized it. The more
that we know concerning the narrowly Prussian feelings of King William,
the centralising pedantry of the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the petty
particularism of the Governments of Bavaria and Wuertemberg, the m