to the existence
of another armed force in the North of Ireland and argued that to create
a second must mean civil war; that he believed revolutionary forces to
exist in Ireland which Redmond could not control and perhaps did not
even suspect. Those who then thought with Lord Kitchener can say now
that events have justified his view. They omit to consider how far those
events proceeded from Lord Kitchener's refusal to accept Redmond's
judgment.

Of the danger Redmond was fully aware. "I understand your position to
be," Mr. T.P. O'Connor wrote to him in January 1915, "that unless your
plan as to the Irish Volunteers is adopted we are face to face with a
most critical and dangerous situation in Ireland." Just as fully was he
convinced of the way to meet it. In February, replying indignantly to
Sir Reginald Brade, who had complained that Irish recruiting was
"distinctly languid," he enumerated the points at which the War Office
had failed to act on his own advice, and urged once more, in the first
instance, his original policy of employing both Ulster and Nationalist
Volunteers for Home Defence. "If the two bodies of volunteers were
trusted with the defence of the country under proper military drill and
discipline, the result would unquestionably be that a large number of
them would volunteer for the front. Recruiting can best be promoted by
creating an atmosphere in which the patriotism of the younger men of the
country can be evoked, and we have done a good deal already in this
direction."

On April 4th a display was made of the force available. A review was
held in the Phoenix Park of 25,000 men--splendid material, but half of
them with neither arms nor uniform. The Unionist Press was friendly in
its comments upon the statement which Redmond supplied after the parade,
claiming that these men should be utilized for Home Defence. That day
was Easter Sunday of 1915. No one guessed then what the next Easter was
going to bring about.

On April 19th I find him writing officially to Mr. Birrell, seeking the
Chief Secretary's influence with the War Office, and claiming, what was
the truth, that the Irish Command shared his view. But at the moment
recruiting was increasing weekly and the War Office were in no mood to
make further concessions than those by which the improvement had been
brought about. Then came the Coalition, and the consequent reduction of
recruiting from close on 7,000 to 3,000 a month; and in July the
Adj