ld, it is also the source of that love in man, which, by
self-expenditure, seeks to remedy it. If the external world is merely an
expression of a remorseless Power, whence comes the love which is the
principle of the moral life in man? The same Power brings the antidote
as well as the bane. And, further, the bane exists for the sake of the
antidote, the wrong for the sake of the remedy. The evil in the world is
means to a higher good, and the only means possible; for it calls into
activity the divine element in man, and thereby contributes to its
realization in his character. It gives the necessary opportunity for the
exercise of love.

Hence, evil cannot be regarded as ultimately real. It is real only as a
stage in growth, as means to an end; and the means necessarily perishes,
or is absorbed in, the attainment of the end. It has no significance
except by reference to that end. From this point of view, evil is the
resistance which makes progress possible, the negative which gives
meaning to the positive, the darkness that makes day beautiful. This
must not, however, be taken to mean that evil is nothing. It is
resistance; it is negative; it does oppose the good; although its
opposition is finally overcome. If it did not, if evil were unreal,
there would be no possibility of calling forth the moral potency of man,
and the moral life would be a figment. But these two conditions of the
moral life--on the one hand, that the evil of the world must be capable
of being overcome and is there for the purpose of being overcome, and
that it is unreal except as a means to the good; and, on the other hand,
that evil must be actually opposed to the good, if the good is to have
any meaning,--cannot, Browning thinks, be reconciled with each other. It
is manifest that the intellect of man cannot, at the same time, regard
evil as both real and unreal. It must assert the one and deny the other;
or else we must regard its testimony as altogether untrustworthy. But
the first alternative is destructive of the moral consciousness. Moral
life is alike impossible whether we deny or assert the real existence of
evil. The latter alternative stultifies knowledge, and leaves all the
deeper concerns of life--the existence of good and evil, the reality of
the distinction between them, the existence of God, the moral governance
of the world, the destiny of man--in a state of absolute uncertainty. We
must reject the testimony either of the heart or of