re of man
and the world, would remain precisely where it was. The explanation
would still begin with mind and end there. The principles of the
materialistic explanation of the world would still be derived from
intelligence; mind would still underlie all it explained, and completed
science would still be, in this sense, anthropomorphic. The charge of
anthropomorphism thus falls to the ground, because it would prove too
much. It is a weapon which cuts the hand that wields it. And, as
directed against idealism, it only shows that he who uses it has
inadequate notions both of the nature of the self and of the world, and
is not aware that each gets meaning, only as an exponent of the other.

On the whole, we may say that it is not men of science who now assail
philosophy, because it gives an idealistic explanation of the world, so
much as unsystematic dabblers in matters of thought. The best men of
science, rather, show a tendency to acquiesce in a kind of dualism of
matter and spirit, and to leave morality and religion, art and
philosophy to pursue their own ends undisturbed. Mr. Huxley, for
instance, and some others, offer two philosophical solutions, one
proceeding from the material world and the other from the sensations and
other "facts of consciousness." They say that we may either explain man
as a natural phenomenon, or the world as a mental one.

But it is a little difficult not to ask which of these explanations is
true. Both of them cannot well be, seeing that they are different. And
neither of them can be adopted without very serious consequences. It
would require considerable hardihood to suggest that natural science
should be swept away in favour of psychology, which would be done if the
one view held by Mr. Huxley were true. And, in my opinion, it requires
quite as much hardihood to suggest the adoption of a theory that makes
morality and religion illusory, which would be done were the other view
valid.

As a matter of fact, however, such an attitude can scarcely be held by
any one who is interested _both_ in the success of natural science and
in the spiritual development of mankind. We are constrained rather to
say that, if these rival lines of thought lead us to deny either the
outer world of things, or the world of thought and morality, then they
must both be wrong. They are not "explanations" but false theories, if
they lead to such conclusions as these. And, instead of holding them up
to the world as th