ays. The interruption was likely to create disturbance there
and derange all our plans for supply. It was plain that we should
have to be content with having foiled the enemy's plan to inflict a
severe blow upon us, and that we might congratulate ourselves that
with two brigades against four we had regained our line without
serious loss. I therefore ordered that the troops be allowed to rest
till three o'clock in the morning of the 18th, and that the column
then retire behind the Blue-stone River. The movement was made
without interruption, and a camp on Flat-top Mountain was selected,
from which the roads on every side were well guarded, and which was
almost impregnable in itself. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p. 209.]
Our casualties of all kinds in the affairs about Princeton had been
only 113, as the enemy had not delivered any serious attack, and the
contest on our side had been one of manoeuvre in which our only
chance of important results was in attacking either Heth or Marshall
when they were so far separated that they could not unite against us
on the field of battle. After the 15th this chance did not exist,
and wisdom dictated that we should retire to a safe point from which
we could watch for contingencies which might give us a better
opportunity. Our experience proved what I have before stated, that
the facility for railway concentration of the enemy in our front
made this line a useless one for aggressive movements, as they could
always concentrate a superior force after they received the news of
our being in motion. It also showed the error of dividing my forces
on two lines, for had Crook's brigade been with me, or my two
brigades with him, we should have felt strong enough to cope with
the force which was actually in our front, and would at least have
made it necessary for the enemy to detach still more troops from
other movements to meet us. Our campaign, though a little one, very
well illustrates the character of the subordinate movements so often
attempted during the war, and shows that the same principles of
strategy are found operating as in great movements. The scale is a
reduced one, but cause and effect are linked by the same necessity
as on a broader theatre of warfare.
CHAPTER XI
POPE IN COMMAND--TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON
A key position--Crook's engagement at Lewisburg--Watching and
scouting--Mountain work--Pope in command--Consolidation of
Departments--Suggestions of our transfer to t
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