FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203  
204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   >>   >|  
ays. The interruption was likely to create disturbance there and derange all our plans for supply. It was plain that we should have to be content with having foiled the enemy's plan to inflict a severe blow upon us, and that we might congratulate ourselves that with two brigades against four we had regained our line without serious loss. I therefore ordered that the troops be allowed to rest till three o'clock in the morning of the 18th, and that the column then retire behind the Blue-stone River. The movement was made without interruption, and a camp on Flat-top Mountain was selected, from which the roads on every side were well guarded, and which was almost impregnable in itself. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iii. p. 209.] Our casualties of all kinds in the affairs about Princeton had been only 113, as the enemy had not delivered any serious attack, and the contest on our side had been one of manoeuvre in which our only chance of important results was in attacking either Heth or Marshall when they were so far separated that they could not unite against us on the field of battle. After the 15th this chance did not exist, and wisdom dictated that we should retire to a safe point from which we could watch for contingencies which might give us a better opportunity. Our experience proved what I have before stated, that the facility for railway concentration of the enemy in our front made this line a useless one for aggressive movements, as they could always concentrate a superior force after they received the news of our being in motion. It also showed the error of dividing my forces on two lines, for had Crook's brigade been with me, or my two brigades with him, we should have felt strong enough to cope with the force which was actually in our front, and would at least have made it necessary for the enemy to detach still more troops from other movements to meet us. Our campaign, though a little one, very well illustrates the character of the subordinate movements so often attempted during the war, and shows that the same principles of strategy are found operating as in great movements. The scale is a reduced one, but cause and effect are linked by the same necessity as on a broader theatre of warfare. CHAPTER XI POPE IN COMMAND--TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON A key position--Crook's engagement at Lewisburg--Watching and scouting--Mountain work--Pope in command--Consolidation of Departments--Suggestions of our transfer to t
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203  
204   205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

movements

 

chance

 
troops
 

retire

 

interruption

 

brigades

 

Mountain

 

Consolidation

 

detach

 

Departments


Suggestions

 
transfer
 
strong
 

forces

 
concentrate
 
superior
 

received

 

railway

 

concentration

 

useless


aggressive

 

brigade

 

dividing

 

motion

 

showed

 

subordinate

 

broader

 

necessity

 

theatre

 
warfare

CHAPTER

 

linked

 
scouting
 

effect

 

Lewisburg

 
position
 

WASHINGTON

 
COMMAND
 

TRANSFER

 
Watching

reduced

 

character

 

illustrates

 
engagement
 

attempted

 

command

 
campaign
 

operating

 

facility

 
strategy