defeat by Lee was taken to prove him
contemptible as a commander, by the very men who lauded McClellan
for having escaped destruction from the same army. There was neither
intelligence nor consistency in the vituperation with which he was
covered; but there was abundant proof that the wounded _amour
propre_ of the officers and men of the Potomac Army made them
practically a unit in intense dislike and distrust of him. It may be
that this condition of things destroyed his possibility of
usefulness at the East; but it would be asking too much of human
nature (certainly too much of Pope's impetuous nature) to ask him to
take meekly the office of scapegoat for the disastrous result of the
whole campaign. His demand on Halleck that he should publish the
approval he had personally given to the several steps of the
movements and combats from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly was just, but
it was imprudent. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xii. pt. iii.
pp. 812, 821.] Halleck was irritated, and made more ready to
sacrifice his subordinate. Mr. Lincoln was saddened and embarrassed;
but being persuaded that Pope's usefulness was spoiled, he swallowed
his own pride and sense of justice, and turned again to McClellan as
the resource in the emergency of the moment.

Pope seems to me entirely right in claiming that Jackson's raid to
Manassas was a thing which should have resulted in the destruction
of that column. He seems to have kept his head, and to have prepared
his combinations skilfully for making Jackson pay the penalty of his
audacity. There were a few hours of apparent hesitation on August
28th, but champions of McClellan should be the last to urge that
against him. His plans were deranged on that day by the accident of
McDowell's absence from his own command. This happened through an
excess of zeal on McDowell's part to find his commander and give him
the benefit of his knowledge of the topography of the country; yet
it proved a serious misfortune, and shows how perilous it is for any
officer to be away from his troops, no matter for what reason. Many
still think Porter's inaction on the 29th prevented the advantage
over Jackson from becoming a victory. [Footnote: I have treated this
subject at large in "The Second Battle of Bull Run as connected with
the Fitz-John Porter Case."] But after all, when the army was united
within our lines, the injuries it had inflicted on the enemy so
nearly balanced those it had received that if