er to make its discriminations between the false and
the true, philosophy arrogates to itself the enforcement of the
distinction at its own cost.

More than once, this essay has intimated that the counterpart of the
idea of invidiously real reality is the spectator notion of knowledge.
If the knower, however defined, is set over against the world to be
known, knowing consists in possessing a transcript, more or less
accurate but otiose, of real things. Whether this transcript is
presentative in character (as realists say) or whether it is by means of
states of consciousness which represent things (as subjectivists say),
is a matter of great importance in its own context. But, in another
regard, this difference is negligible in comparison with the point in
which both agree. Knowing is viewing from outside. But if it be true
that the self or subject of experience is part and parcel of the course
of events, it follows that the self _becomes_ a knower. It becomes a
mind in virtue of a distinctive way of partaking in the course of
events. The significant distinction is no longer between the knower
_and_ the world; it is between different ways of being in and of the
movement of things; between a brute physical way and a purposive,
intelligent way.

There is no call to repeat in detail the statements which have been
advanced. Their net purport is that the directive presence of future
possibilities in dealing with existent conditions is what is meant by
knowing; that the self becomes a knower or mind when anticipation of
future consequences operates as its stimulus. What we are now concerned
with is the effect of this conception upon the nature of philosophic
knowing.

As far as I can judge, popular response to pragmatic philosophy was
moved by two quite different considerations. By some it was thought to
provide a new species of sanctions, a new mode of apologetics, for
certain religious ideas whose standing had been threatened. By others,
it was welcomed because it was taken as a sign that philosophy was about
to surrender its otiose and speculative remoteness; that philosophers
were beginning to recognize that philosophy is of account only if, like
everyday knowing and like science, it affords guidance to action and
thereby makes a difference in the event. It was welcomed as a sign that
philosophers were willing to have the worth of their philosophizing
measured by responsible tests.

I have not seen this point of view