ty extends to the whole field of conduct.
Except in extreme pathological cases (and in epistemology), complete
skepticism and aboulia do not occur. Ambiguity always falls within a
field or direction of conduct, and though it may extend much further,
and must extend some further than the point at which equivocation
occurs, yet it is never ubiquitous. An ambiguity concerning the action
of gravitation is no less specific than one regarding color or sound;
indeed, the one may be found to involve the other.

Logical conduct is, then, conduct which aims to remove ambiguity and
inhibition in unreflective conduct. The instruments of its operation are
forged from the processes of unreflective conduct by such modification
and adaptation as is required to enable them to accomplish this end.
Since these logical operations sometimes fail and sometimes succeed they
become the subject-matter of logical theory. But the technique of this
second involution of reflection is not supplied by some new and unique
entity. It also is derived from modifications of previous operations of
both reflective and non-reflective conduct.

While emphasizing the continuity between non-logical and logical
operations, we must keep in mind that their distinction is of equal
importance. Confusion at this point is fatal. A case in point is the
confusion between non-logical and logical observation. The results of
non-logical observation, e.g., looking and listening, are direct stimuli
to further conduct. But the purpose and result of _logical_ observation
are to secure data, not as direct stimuli to immediate conduct but as
stimuli to the construction or verification of hypotheses which are the
responses of the _logical_ operation of imagination to the data.
Hypotheses are anticipatory. But they differ from non-logical
anticipation in that they are tentatively, experimentally, i.e.,
logically anticipatory. The non-logical operations of memory and
anticipation lack just this tentative, experimental character. When we
confuse the logical and non-logical operations of these processes the
result is either that logical processes will merely repeat non-logical
operations in which case we have inference that is tautologous and
trifling; or the non-logical will attempt to perform logical operations,
and our inference is miraculous. If we seek to escape by an appeal to
habit, as in empiricism, or to an objective universal, as in idealism
and neo-realism, we are merely