es, as to say the same of these leases.
It would be just as rational to maintain, because A. does not choose to
make an associate of B., that he is acting in opposition to the "spirit
of the institutions," inasmuch as the Declaration of Independence
advances the dogmas that men are born equal, as it is to say it is
opposed to the same spirit, for B. to pay rent to A. according to his
covenant.

It is pretended that the durable leases are feudal in their nature. We
do not conceive this to be true; but, admitting it to be so, it would
only prove that feudality, to this extent, is a part of the institutions
of the State. What is more, it would become a part over which the State
itself has conceded all power of control, beyond that which it may
remotely possess as one, out of twenty-eight communities. As respects
this feudal feature, it is not easy to say where it must be looked for.
It is not to be found in the simple fact of paying rent, for that is so
general as to render the whole country feudal, could it be true; it
cannot be in the circumstance that the rent is to be paid "in kind," as
it is called, and in labour, for that is an advantage to the tenant, by
affording him the option, since the penalty of a failure leaves the
alternative of paying in money. It must be, therefore, that these leases
are feudal because they run for ever! Now the length of the lease is
clearly a concession to the tenant, and was so regarded when received;
and there is not probably a single tenant, under lives, who would not
gladly exchange his term of possession for that of one of these
detestable durable leases!

Among the absurdities that have been circulated on this subject of
feudality, it has been pretended that the well-known English statute of
"_quia emptores_" has prohibited fines for alienation; or that the
quarter-sales, fifth-sales, sixth-sales, &c. of our own leases were
contrary to the law of the realm, when made. Under the common law, in
certain cases of feudal tenures, the fines for alienation were an
incident of the tenure. The statute of _quia emptores_ abolished that
general principle, but it in no manner forbade parties _to enter into
covenants of the nature of quarter-sales_, did they see fit. The common
law gives all the real estate to the eldest son. Our statute divides the
real estate among the nearest of kin, without regard even to sex. It
might just as well be pretended that the father cannot devise all his
lands t