er had no difficulty in instantly obeying the
orders from Moodkee, and in arriving next morning at headquarters in
time to share the peril and the glory of one of the most dreadful
contests in which we were ever engaged in Europe or in Asia. The
inaction of the Sikhs at Ferozepore is, in the present state of our
information, unintelligible; but it would be an idle waste of time and
space to speculate upon the consequences of a peril which did not assail
us, or harrow our minds with the probability of disasters and
difficulties from which we never suffered.

At Moodkee, our army, for most needful repose, and fully to prepare for
a more gigantic effort, rested two days. In this interval the
Governor-General took a step which has not escaped comment, in offering
to the Commander-in-Chief his services as second in command of the army.
He did right. Battalions and brigades could hardly have strengthened the
hands of the general, and invigorated the spirits of the troops, so much
as the active accession of Hardinge. Prim etiquette may pucker its thin
lips, and solemn discretion knit its ponderous brows; but neither
discipline nor prudence ran any risk of being injured or affronted by
the veteran of the Peninsula. What the exigency required, he knew; what
the exigency exacted, he performed. That those who censure would not
have imitated his conduct, in defiance of the admonitions of the
hundred-throated Sikh ordnance, we may allowably imagine. Such critics,
being themselves governors-general, would probably have received beneath
the cool verandas of Calcutta the news of the tempestuous bivouacs of
Ferozeshah. For ourselves, we learn with pride and satisfaction, that
when offensive operations were resumed on the morning of the 21st of
December, the charge and direction of the left wing of the army was
committed to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge.

"Breaking up on that morning from Moodkee, our columns of all arms"
(so writes the Commander-in-Chief) "debouched four miles on the
road to Ferozeshah, where it was known that the enemy, posted in
great force and with a most formidable artillery, had remained
since the action of the 18th, incessantly employed in intrenching
his position. Instead of advancing to the direct attack of their
formidable works, our force manoeuvred to their right; the second
and fourth divisions of infantry in front, supported by the first
division and cav