henceforth the free passage of
their troops into the Lahore possessions on this side the Sutlej.
"I need only remark, on the first and most essential point, that
the Sikh army did in the beginning of last January prepare to move
to the Sutlej. The political agent remonstrated, and the troops
were withdrawn; the reason then assigned for the movement being the
same as that now intended to be brought forward, namely, the state
of our military preparations on the frontier. The Governor-General
in Council, in a despatch to Major Broadfoot of the 25th January
1845, entered into very full explanations, which were conveyed to
the Lahore Vakeel.
"As regards the past, it is clear that no cause of complaint has
been given by the government of India. If it should be asserted
that our military preparations this autumn have given offence, the
assertion is equally unfounded, and is a mere pretext for hostile
proceedings, which have originated in the political weakness and
the internal dissensions of the Lahore government; and, above all,
in their desire to be released, on any terms, from the terror which
the ferocity of their own troops has inspired. The proof is to be
found in the fact, that at the time these disorderly movements
commenced, no additional British troops had reached our frontier
stations. The additional regiment of native infantry, destined for
the reinforcement of Ferozepore, had not arrived. At Loodianah one
of the two regiments of native cavalry had actually marched for
Scinde before it was relieved, leaving that post, as it is at
present, with one regiment, instead of the usual complement of two
regiments of cavalry. At the other stations no alterations had been
made, and the troops which had marched were peaceably engaged in
completing the annual reliefs according to custom at this season.
"Such is the state of affairs at the present moment, and although
my conviction is strong that the Sikh army will be deterred from
acts of aggression, on account of the state of our military
preparation, yet it is by no means impossible that we may be forced
at any moment into war, and that operations, on a very extended
scale, may be immediately necessary.
"My views and measures will be anxiously directed to avoid a
recourse to arms, as long a
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