ur expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little
aids of money have been received after long solicitation, hardly so
much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that
no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our
alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion.
Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her,
even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the
next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive
operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no
certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment
of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to
sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war.

To France, then, we turn, as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is
at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the
attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us,
in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves, that
she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her
fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles;
she has made various efforts to restore our finances, by paying the
interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account
for clothing, arms, and necessaries; by advancing money, and by
opening and guaranteeing a loan for us, to a considerable amount in
Holland, when, by the abolition of paper, our finances were totally
deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is
about to be opened. France assures, that it is not in her power to
make us any further grants of money, her ministers repeat this to us
in every letter, in a tone that persuades us of their determination on
that point.

What then is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes, which the
present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one
decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an
active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system
we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak defensive war with an
unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be
torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and
I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those
means, which we have in our own hands, if we dare call them forth,