wal of the
Austro-Hungarian troops from the sanjak of Novibazar. (See EUROPE:
_History_.)

[Sidenote: Internal difficulties.]

Meanwhile the relations between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy had
again become critical. The agreement of 1907 had been but a truce in the
battle between two irreconcilable principles: between Magyar nationalism,
determined to maintain its ascendancy in an independent Hungary, and
Habsburg imperialism, equally determined to preserve the economic and
military unity of the Dual Monarchy. In this conflict the tactical
advantage lay with the monarchy; for the Magyars were in a minority in
Hungary, their ascendancy was based on a narrow and artificial franchise,
and it was open to the king-emperor to hold _in terrorem_ over them an
appeal to the disfranchised majority. It was the introduction of a
Universal Suffrage Bill by Mr Joseph Kristoffy, minister of the interior in
the "unconstitutional" cabinet of Baron Fejervary, which brought the
Opposition leaders in the Hungarian parliament to terms and made possible
the agreement of 1907. But the Wekerle ministry which succeeded that of
Fejervary on the 9th of April 1906 contained elements which made any
lasting compromise impossible. The burning question of the "Magyar word of
command" remained unsettled, save in so far as the fixed determination of
the king-emperor had settled it; the equally important question of the
renewal of the charter of the Austro-Hungarian State Bank had also formed
no part of the agreement of 1907. On the other hand, the Wekerle ministry
was pledged to a measure of franchise reform, a pledge which they showed no
eagerness to redeem, though the granting of universal suffrage in the
Austrian half of the Monarchy had made such a change inevitable. In March
1908 Mr Hallo laid before the Hungarian parliament a formal proposal that
the charter of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which was to expire at the end of
1910, should not be renewed; and that, in the event of failure to negotiate
a convention between the banks of Austria and Hungary, a separate Hungarian
Bank should be established. This question, obscured during the winter by
the Balkan crisis, once more became acute in the spring of 1909. In the
Coalition cabinet itself opinion was sharply divided, but in the end the
views of the Independence party prevailed, and Dr Wekerle laid the proposal
for a separate Hungarian Bank before the king-emperor and the Austrian
government.