that some regiments, and
notably those of the reserve, should be excepted from this sweeping
condemnation. Drunkenness, marauding, and other military crimes grew
more and more general as the main body marched "in a drove" through
Villafranca to Lugo, where Moore vainly offered battle, and onwards to
Betanzos on the sea-coast. There a marvellous rally was effected,
stragglers rejoined the ranks in unexpected numbers, the _moral_ of the
soldiery was restored as the fearful strain of physical misery was
relaxed, and by January 12, 1809, all the divisions of Moore's army were
safely posted in or around Coruna. Bad weather had delayed the fleet of
transports ordered round from Vigo, but it ran into the harbour on the
14th, and the sick and invalids were sent on board.

[Pageheading: _THE BATTLE OF CORUNA._]

Moore was advised to make terms for the embarkation of his entire
command, but he was too good a soldier to comply. Those who took part in
the battle of Coruna on the 16th, some 15,000 men in all, were no
unworthy representatives of the army which started from Lisbon three
months earlier. Soult, with a larger force, assumed the offensive, and
made a determined attack on the British position in front of the harbour
and town of Coruna. He was repulsed at all points, but Moore was
mortally, and Baird severely, wounded on the field. Hope, who took
command, knowing that Soult would soon be reinforced, wisely persisted
in carrying out Moore's intention, evacuated Coruna, and embarked his
army for England during the night and the following day. His losses were
estimated by Hope at above 700, killed and wounded; those of the enemy
were twice as great. Thus victory crowned a campaign which otherwise
would have done little to satisfy the popular appetite for tangible
success. The original object of supporting the Spanish resistance in the
north had been rendered impossible of fulfilment by Napoleon's victories
when Moore had barely crossed the Spanish frontier, and in this sense
the expedition must be regarded as a failure, though its commander was
in no sense responsible for its ill-success. On the other hand,
considered as a skilful diversion, the expedition was highly successful.
It drew all the best French troops and generals into the north-west
corner of Spain, leaving all the other, and far richer, provinces to
recover their power of resistance.[43]

The spirit in which Napoleon had entered upon this contest is well
illu