r head of that great Mahratta confederacy, of
which Sindiah was then the only member retaining any degree of
independence, was busied in conspiracies, the absurdity of the proposed
means for which was not[24] (as some of his advocates in England
attempted to maintain) a proof of their non-existence. Had the old
Mahratta spirit been then alive in the breast of the degenerate
successor of Dowlut Rao, the appearance in the field of 20,000 troops
with a considerable share of discipline, and a numerous and excellent
artillery, might at once have given the signal, and formed a nucleus,
for a rising which would have comprehended almost every man who could
bear arms, and would have shaken to the centre, if not overthrown
utterly, the mighty fabric of our Eastern empire. It is true that the
indolent and sensual character of Jankojee Sindiah gave no grounds for
apprehension at the time; and the period of danger has now passed away;
nor is it probable that the Gwalior army, even if left at its present
strength, can ever again be in a situation to give trouble to our
government. But it is not less true, that when our difficulties were
greatest, a disciplined force did exist, in a position the most central
in India, which might have turned the quivering beam, if it had been
thrown into the scale against us in the moment of extreme peril.[25]

It is, therefore, with far different feelings from those expressed by
some of the newspaper scribes, both in India and England, that we heard
the declaration ascribed to the present governor-general, on his arrival
in India, "that the army should be his first care;"[26] and have
witnessed the spirit in which it has since been acted upon. "India,"
again to quote his own words on a late public occasion, "was won by the
sword;" yet the military spirit of the army, on which the preservation
of our empire depends, had been damped, and its efficiency wofully
impaired, by the injudicious reductions introduced by Lord William
Bentinck and persevered in by his successor; and the reverses and losses
of the Affghan war, following close in the train of these ill-advised
measures, had produced a disaffection for the service, and deterioration
in the _morale_ of the sepoys, from which evil auguries were drawn by
those best acquainted with the peculiar temperament of the native
soldiery.[27] The efforts of Lord Ellenborough have been from the first
directed to remove this unfavourable impression of neglect fro