e two theories, in spite of all traces of Darwinism in
the scientific parts of anthropology, is possible when we acknowledge the
moral demand, if once present and valid, in its entire and, so to speak,
its metaphysical independence in its full value, far exceeding all natural
necessity.

It is shown by Mivart that such an absolute authority of the ethical
demands, and such an independence of the whole science of morality, may be
brought into accord with the scientific theories of development. In his
book on "The Genesis of Species," he devotes a whole chapter to ethical
questions. He discriminates, in the moral good, between the formal good
(good with consciousness and will of the good) and the {246} material good
(good without consciousness and design), ascribes only the latter to the
animal world in its moral features, and the former exclusively to mankind,
and thus takes ground quite analogous to that held by him on the religious
question, where he includes in the theory of development the physical part
of man, but excludes the intellectual part, with the single qualification
that in the religious question he unnecessarily renders his position more
difficult by designating this intellectual or spiritual part by the term
"soul."

German authorities, who see in Darwinism only a scientific question which
can be solved by means of natural investigation, and who therefore, think
the religious and ethical questions but little affected by it, have
expressed themselves in regard to this neutral position toward morality
still more rarely than as to its neutrality toward religion. The reason for
this is probably that the independence of moral principles and the
absoluteness of their authority entirely result from themselves, as soon as
we have once admitted theism and left room in general for a freedom
standing above natural causality--and perhaps it is due to the further fact
that the realm of the moral is more palpably urged as a reality and
necessity upon even the most indifferent mind than the realm of religion.

On the other hand, we find frequent utterances which _indirectly_ refer to
the ethical realm--for instance, expressions in reference to the ethical
importance of an animal descent of man. Alex. Braun says: "Man _assents_ to
the idea of being appointed _lord_ of the creatures, but then he may also
acknowledge that he is not placed over his subjects as a stranger, but
originated from the {247} beings whose lord he