phic problems before which the descent idea places us, is
really solved: neither the origin of self-consciousness and of moral
self-determination, nor the origin of consciousness and of sensation, nor
the origin of life; and even the theory of atoms, although it is quite
important and indispensable for the natural philosopher and chemist
according to the present state of his knowledge and investigation, has not
yet been able to divest itself of its hypothetical character. Religion
might, therefore, refuse to define its position in reference to theories
which are still of a quite problematic and hypothetical nature. But by
giving such a refusal, religion would not act in its own interest. The
reproach is often made that it has an open or hidden aversion to the
freedom of scientific investigation--a reproach which, it is true, is often
enough provoked by its own advocates; often the assertion is made by
advocates of free investigation, that free science has led, or can lead at
any moment, to results which shake or even destroy theism and with it the
objective and scientifically established truth of a religious view of the
world. The consequence of this assertion is exactly, as before-mentioned,
that minds whose religious possession is to them an inviolable sanctuary,
and who lack time and occasion, inclination and ability, to examine
scientifically these asserted results of science, really suspect free
science and contest the right of its existence. Another consequence of this
state of war between religion and science is the fact that so many minds in
both camps fall into a servile dependence upon battle-cries: they confound
freedom of investigation with license; science with apathy or {275}
hostility to faith; faith with lack of scientific perception, blind
unreasoning belief, etc. Such a state of affairs does not, indeed, serve
the interests of peace and truth; only a correct treatment of philosophy as
well as of religion can lead to them.

Such a way of peace and truth from the side of religion and its scientific
treatment is entered upon, when religion sets itself right, not only with
all real, but also with all _conceivable_, _possible_ results of the other
sciences, not only of the exact, but also of the philosophic sciences. If
it finds, in such an investigation, that such conceivable results are
reconcilable with the theistic view of the world which is the basis of
religion, it has already shown its relationship to