nd that in rear of the ridge another
steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds
of Boers completely covered from our fire.
This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must
advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no
way of getting round this hill.
Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out,
outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to
keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically
by one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in
sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.
[Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked the
lives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started.]
As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render
assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of
Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless
attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt,
moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless
slaughter.
[9.15 a.m.]
With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the
Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a
guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the
force.
To this Commandant Cronje replied by a guarantee of the lives of all,
provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.
In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan
subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he
would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until
our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.
I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to
loss of time from the following causes:
(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of
Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with
the Johannesburg force.
(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to
the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously
promised by Johannesburg.
(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed
Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.
[How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland;
nothing in the Letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which they
wrote at 11 a.m. Wednesday; nothing in the messag
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