e directly attributable to the great
Moral Governor of the human race. Every successive act of research or
travel will impress him more and more deeply with this truth, which, for
the sake of his own peace and liberality, it would be well that he
should carry about with him from the outset. He will not visit
individuals with any bitterness of censure for participating in
prevalent faults. He will regard social virtues and graces as shedding
honour on all whom they overshadow, from the loftiest to the lowliest;
while he is not disposed to indulge contempt, or anything but a mild
compassion, for any social depravity or deformity which, being the clear
result of circumstances, and itself a circumstance, may be considered as
surely destined to be remedied, as the wisdom of associated, like that
of individual man, grows with his growth, and strengthens with his
strength.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL REQUISITES.

"I respect knowledge; but I do not despise ignorance. They think
only as their fathers thought, worship as they worshipped. They
do no more."--ROGERS.

"He was alive
To all that was enjoyed where'er he went,
And all that was endured." WORDSWORTH.

The traveller, being furnished with the philosophical requisites for the
observation of morals and manners,

1stly. With a certainty of what it is that he wants to know,--

2ndly. With principles which may serve as a rallying point and test of
his observations,--

3rdly. With, for instance, a philosophical and definite, instead of a
popular and vague, notion about the origin of human feelings of right
and wrong,--

4thly. And with a settled conviction that prevalent virtues and vices
are the result of gigantic general influences,--is yet not fitted for
his object if certain moral requisites be wanting in him.

An observer, to be perfectly accurate, should be himself perfect. Every
prejudice, every moral perversion, dims or distorts whatever the eye
looks upon. But as we do not wait to be perfect before we travel, we
must content ourselves with discovering, in order to avoidance, what
would make our task hopeless, and how we may put ourselves in a state to
learn at least something truly. We cannot suddenly make ourselves a
great deal better than we have been, for such an object as observing
Morals and Manners; but, by clearly ascertaining what it is that the
most commonly, or the most grossly, vitiates foreign