emselves
rather in the literary form than in the philosophical substance. We
find here all the familiar Socratic propositions, that virtue is
knowledge, is one, is teachable; that all men seek the good, but that
men differ as to what the good is; that a man who does wrong
deliberately is better than a man who does it unintentionally; and so
on. Moreover, just as Socrates had occupied himself in attempting to
fix the concepts of the virtues, asking "what is prudence?", "what is
temperance?", and the like, so in many of these dialogues Plato
pursues similar inquiries. The "Lysis" discusses the concept of
friendship, the "Charmides" of temperance, the "Laches" of bravery. On
the whole, the philosophical substance of these early writings is thin
and meagre. There is a preponderance of incident and much biographical
detail regarding Socrates. There is more art than matter.
Consequently, from a purely literary point of view, these are among
the most charming of Plato's dialogues, and many of them, such as the
"Apology" and the "Crito," are especially popular with those who care
for Plato rather as an artist than as a philosopher.

The second group of dialogues is generally connected with the period
of Plato's travels. In addition to the influence of Socrates, we have
now the influence of the Eleatics, which naturally connects these
dialogues with the period of the philosopher's sojourn at Megara. But
it is in these dialogues, too, that Plato for the first time {174}
develops his own special philosophical thesis. This is in fact his
great constructive period. The central and governing principle of his
philosophy is the theory of Ideas. All else hinges on this, and is
dominated by this. In a sense, his whole philosophy is nothing but the
theory of Ideas and what depends upon it. It is in this second period
that the theory of Ideas is founded and developed, and its
relationship to the Eleatic philosophy of Being discussed. We have
here the spectacle of Plato's most original thoughts in the pangs of
childbirth. He is now at grips with the central problems of
philosophy. He is intent upon the thought itself, and cares little for
the ornaments of style. He is struggling to find expression for ideas
newly-formed in his mind, of which he is not yet completely master,
and which he cannot manipulate with ease. Consequently, the literary
graces of the first period recede into the background. There is little
incident, and no humour. The