and implement-making,
and transferred from these crafts to the shapes intended to represent
or imitate natural objects, yet the distinction between _Beautiful_
and _Ugly_ does not belong either solely or necessarily to what we
call _Art._ Therefore the satisfaction of the shape-perceptive or
aesthetic preferences must not be confused with any of the many and
various other aims and activities to which art is due and by which it
is carried on. Conversely: although in its more developed phases,
and after the attainment of technical facility, art has been
differentiated from other human employment by its foreseeing the
possibility of shape-contemplation and therefore submitting itself to
what I have elsewhere called the _aesthetic imperative,_ yet art has
invariably started from some desire other than that of affording
satisfactory shape-contemplation, with the one exception of cases
where it has been used to keep or reproduce opportunities of such
shape contemplation already accidentally afforded by natural shapes,
say, those of flowers or animals or landscapes, or even occasionally
of human beings, which had already been enjoyed as beautiful. All
art therefore, except that of children, savages, ignoramuses and
extreme innovators, invariably avoids ugly shapes and seeks for
beautiful ones; _but art does this while pursuing all manner of
different aims._ These non-aesthetic aims of art may be roughly
divided into (A) the making of useful objects ranging from clothes
to weapons and from a pitcher to a temple; (B) the registering or
transmitting of facts and their visualising, as in portraits, historical
pictures or literature, and book illustration; and (C) the awakening,
intensifying or maintaining of definite emotional states, as especially
by music and literature, but also by painting and architecture when
employed as "aids to devotion." And these large classes may again
be subdivided and connected, if the Reader has a mind to, into
utilitarian, social, ritual, sentimental, scientific and other aims, some
of them not countenanced or not avowed by contemporary morality.
How the aesthetic imperative, i.e. the necessities of satisfactory
shape-contemplation, qualifies and deflects the pursuit of such
non-aesthetic aims of art can be shown by comparing, for instance, the
mere audible devices for conveying conventional meaning and
producing and keeping up emotional conditions, viz. the hootings
and screechings of modern indu
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