ral Divine Persons Can Assume One and the Same Individual
Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there
be only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one
person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be
destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three
Persons can take one human nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person,
as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one
human nature.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of God
the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of
the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to
assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of
each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely,
what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons.
Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would
be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God;
and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three
Persons should assume one human nature.

_On the contrary,_ The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But
the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they
can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human
nature be assumed by the three Persons.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 2, A. 5, ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude
another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same
Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole
reason of the deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep.
ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we