successful than the old. Within a couple of
days this force also had settled down to a war of positions. Winter was
approaching; our positions on the peninsula would then become no longer
tenable. No progress could be made, and at length it was decided to
evacuate. The Suvla Bay force was withdrawn first; and the evacuation of
the main body of troops was completed on the 20th December. The
withdrawal was carried out with the same brilliance that had
characterized the various landings, and with so small a number of
casualties that it was described as "an achievement without parallel in
the annals of war."
Many of the regiments that fought against the Turks at Gallipoli were
withdrawn, directly or indirectly to Egypt, and subsequently met the
Turk again during the advance into Palestine. Included among these were
the 10th, 52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions, besides regiments of Anzacs and
Yeomanry. In so far as the Dardanelles operations aimed at protecting
Egypt, they were a success; for, while they were in progress, no
organized invasion of Egypt was attempted. But the evacuation had the
effect of liberating a large force of Turkey's best troops for
operations against Mesopotamia and Egypt.
It would be convenient to pause here and take stock of the military
situation in Egypt, in the light of over a year's experience of actual
war.
In the first place, the Turks had disillusioned us as to the
impossibility of crossing the waterless desert, and had actually crossed
it with a considerable armed and organized force. They announced that
what they had effected had been nothing more than a reconnaissance. In
any case, they had shown us what they could do, and that, backed by the
resources of the Central Powers, there would be no insuperable obstacle
to their bringing a large and fully equipped army across the desert.
In the second place, we had discovered that the problems of defending
the Suez Canal and of defending Egypt were not identical. While the
Canal formed an admirable moat, an obstacle difficult to negotiate when
stoutly defended, and so a capital defensive line for the protection of
the Nile; yet this line was inadequate for the protection of the Canal
itself or for securing the immunity of the passing shipping.
And so, thirdly, we realized that some other line must be found for the
protection of the Canal. While we were sitting on the west bank, small
parties of Turks approached the eastern bank. On more tha
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