, with ample guarantees and sureties, not only for the
present time, but for an indefinite time; and as long as Great
Britain stands as an independent monarchy. These sureties and
guarantees are said to consist in the discontented and destitute
class of her population, of her operatives and laborers, and the
indispensable necessity of the cotton crop of the United States in
furnishing them with employment and subsistence, without which it is
said she would be torn with internal strife.

I could tell gentlemen who argue in that way, that we have another
guarantee that Great Britain will not break with the United States
for any trivial cause, which they have not thought proper to raise.
We may threaten and denounce and bluster as much as we please about
British violations of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, and the
Mosquito protectorate, about the assumption of territorial dominion
over the Balize or British Honduras, and the new colony of the Bay
Islands; and Great Britain will negotiate, explain, treat, and
transgress, and negotiate again, and resort to any device, before
she will go to war with us, as long as she can hope to prolong the
advantages to herself of the free-trade policy now established with
the United States. It is not only the cotton crop of America which
she covets, but it is the rich market for the products of her
manufacturing industry, which she finds in the United States; and
this has contributed as much as any other cause to improve the
condition of her operatives, and impart increased prosperity to her
trade and revenue. As long as we think proper to hold to our
present commercial regulations, I repeat that it will require very
great provocation on our part to force Great Britain into a war with
the United States. . . .

As for this road, we are told at every turn that it is ridiculous to
talk of war in connection with it, for we will have no wars except
those with the Indians. Both England and France dare not go to war
with us. I say this course of argument is not only unwise and
delusive, but if such sentiments take hold on the country, they will
be mischievous; they will almost to a certainty lead to a daring and
reckless policy on our part; and as each government labors under a
similar delusion as to what the other will not dare to do, what is
more probable than that both may get into such a position--the
result of a mutual mistake--that war must ensue? It is worth while
to reflect upon