the nature,
others denote the special kinds, others imply the manners, others
suggest the ends of this practice. But it seemeth most fully
intelligible by observing the several kinds and degrees thereof;
as also by reflecting on the divers ways and manners of practicing
it.

The principal kinds thereof I observe to be these:--

1. The grossest kind of slander is that which in the Decalogue is
called, bearing false testimony against our neighbor; that is,
flatly charging him with acts which he never committed, and is
nowise guilty of. As in the case of Naboth, when men were suborned
to say, "Naboth did blaspheme God and the king," and as was David's
case, when he thus complained, "False witnesses did rise up, they
laid to my charge things that I knew not of." This kind in the
highest way (that is, in judicial proceedings) is more rare; and of
all men, they who are detected to practice it are held most vile and
infamous, as being plainly the most pernicious and perilous
instruments of injustice, the most desperate enemies of all men's
right and safety that can be. But also out of the court there are
many knights-errant of the poet, whose business it is to run about
scattering false reports; sometimes loudly proclaiming them in open
companies, sometimes closely whispering them in dark corners; thus
infecting conversation with their poisonous breath: these no less
notoriously are guilty of this kind, as bearing always the same
malice and sometimes breeding as ill effects.

2. Another kind is, affixing scandalous names, injurious epithets,
and odious characters upon persons, which they deserve not. As when
Corah and his accomplices did accuse Moses of being ambitious,
unjust, and tyrannical; when the Pharisees called our Lord an
impostor, a blasphemer, a sorcerer, a glutton and wine-bibber, an
incendiary and perverter of the people, one that spake against
Caesar, and forbade to give tribute; when the Apostles were charged
with being pestilent, turbulent, factious, and seditious fellows.
This sort being very common, and thence in ordinary repute not so
bad, yet in just estimation may be judged even worse than the
former, as doing to our neighbor more heavy and more irreparable
wrong. For it imposeth on him really more blame, and that such
which he can hardly shake off; because the charge signifies habits
of evil, and includeth many acts; then, being general and
indefinite, can scarce be disproved. He, for instance