er classes went abroad, and young men
were returning after graduation in American colleges. The police were put
into modern dress and trained on modern lines; and a little modern Korean
Army was launched.

Despite this, things were in an unsatisfactory state. The Emperor, whose
nerve had been broken by his experiences on the night of the murder of the
Queen and in the days following, was weak, uncertain and suspicious. He
could not be relied on save for one thing. He was very jealous of his own
prerogatives, and the belief that some of his best statesmen and advisers
were trying to establish constitutional monarchy, limiting the power of the
Throne, finally caused him to throw in his lot with the anti-Progressive
group.

Then there was no real reform in justice. The prisons retained most of
their mediaeval horrors, and every man held his life and property at the
mercy of the monarch and his assistants.

Some of the foreign advisers were men of high calibre; others were unfitted
for their work, and used their offices to serve their own ends and fill
their own pockets. Advisers or Ministers and foreign contractors apparently
agreed at times to fill their pockets at the cost of the Government. There
is no other rational explanation of some of the contracts concluded, or
some of the supplies received. The representatives of the European Powers
and America were like one great happy family, and the life of the European
and American community in Seoul was for a long time ideal. There came one
jarring experience when a Government--it would be unkind to mention
which--sent a Minister who was a confirmed dipsomaniac. For days after his
arrival he was unable to see the Ministers of State who called on him,
being in one long debauch. The members of his Legation staff had to keep
close watch on him until word could be sent home, when he was promptly
recalled.

The young Koreans who were given power as Ministers and Advisers after the
Monarch escaped from Japanese control were anxious to promote reform and
education, and to introduce some plan of popular administration. They were
aided by one British official, Mr. (now Sir John) McLeavy Brown. Mr. Brown,
trained in the Chinese Customs Service, was given charge of the Korean
Treasury and Customs, at the instigation of the British Government. It was
hoped that this appointment indicated that the British Government would
take a more active interest in Korean affairs. Unfortunately Ko