e year 1784, and to
1806, when the administration of which Lord Grey was the leading member
at once dissolved the existing Parliament on coming into office; though
he believed "the present to be the first occasion on which a House of
Commons had been invited to express its dissatisfaction at the exercise
of the prerogative of dissolution."

To the strictures of Lord Melbourne and Lord Morpeth on the Duke of
Wellington's temporary assumption of a combination of offices, it was
replied by Sir Robert and the Duke that, though there might be
inconvenience from the assumption of all those powers by one individual,
it was so far from being unconstitutional, that it was a common practice
for the Secretary for one department to act for another during intervals
of recreation, or periods of ill-health; that there was ample precedent
for such a proceeding. In the last week of the life of Queen Anne, the
Duke of Shrewsbury had united three of the greatest posts of the
kingdom, those of Lord Treasurer, Lord Chamberlain, and Lord-lieutenant
of Ireland, with the sanction of that great constitutional lawyer, Lord
Somers. And in 1827 Mr. Canning had retained the seals of the Foreign
Office for some weeks after his appointment as First Lord of the
Treasury. Moreover, there was actually a law which provided that when
the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer is vacant the seals of that
office shall be delivered to the Chief-justice; and under this rule, in
the latter part of the reign of George II., Chief-justice Lord Mansfield
had continued finance-minister for above three months. And, as to the
practical result of what had been done in the present instance, the Duke
affirmed, what, indeed, was universally admitted, that the arrangement
had from the first been understood to be merely temporary; that no
inconvenience had resulted from it; indeed, that "not a single act had
been done in any one of the offices which had not been essentially
necessary for the service of the country."

The first two points on which the ministry was assailed it seems
superfluous to examine, since it is clear that the position taken up by
Sir Robert Peel is impregnable: that, on every view of the principles
and practice of the constitution, there was no doubt of the right of the
sovereign to dismiss his ministers or to dissolve the Parliament at his
pleasure; and that those acts can only be judged of by a consideration
of their expediency. Inexpedient, indeed,