ere existence of a strong government
is sufficient; and Caesar was too great and too considerate
to busy himself with the apprehensions which the Italian alarmists
felt regarding these communists of that day, and thereby unduly
to procure a false popularity for his monarchy.
Measures against Pompeians and Republicans
While Caesar thus might leave, and actually left, the late democratic
party to the process of decomposition which had already in its case
advanced almost to the utmost limit, he had on the other hand,
with reference to the former aristocratic party possessing
a far greater vitality, not to bring about its dissolution--
which time alone could accomplish--but to pave the way for
and initiate it by a proper combination of repression and conciliation.
Among minor measures, Caesar, even from a natural sense of propriety,
avoided exasperating the fallen party by empty sarcasm;
he did not triumph over his conquered fellow-burgesses;(3)
he mentioned Pompeius often and always with respect, and caused
his statue overthrown by the people to be re-erected at the senate-
house, when the latter was restored, in its earlier distinguished place.
To political prosecutions after the victory Caesar assigned
the narrowest possible limits. No investigation was instituted
into the various communications which the constitutional party
had held even with nominal Caesarians; Caesar threw the piles of papers
found in the enemy's headquarters at Pharsalus and Thapsus
into the fire unread, and spared himself and the country from political
processes against individuals suspected of high treason. Further,
all the common soldiers who had followed their Roman or provincial
officers into the contest against Caesar came off with impunity.
The sole exception made was in the case of those Roman burgesses,
who had taken service in the army of the Numidian king Juba;
their property was confiscated by way of penalty for their treason.
Even to the officers of the conquered party Caesar had granted
unlimited pardon up to the close of the Spanish campaign of 705;
but he became convinced that in this he had gone too far,
and that the removal at least of the leaders among them was inevitable.
The rule by which he was thenceforth guided was, that every one
who after the capitulation of Ilerda had served as an officer
in the enemy's army or had sat in the opposition-senate, if he survived
the close of the struggle, forfeited his property and his
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