ugh the two sometimes seem to
conflict, they must be reconciled in the way which will best promote the
effective administration of justice and the peace of society. The path
to be followed in achieving this golden mean in the intricacies of
professional relations is not as manifest as the rule of honesty and
morality in ordinary life. The great problem of government that is never
completely solved and that is changing with changing conditions is how
to reconcile the protection of individual rights, helpful to the pursuit
of happiness and the welfare of society, with the necessary curtailment
of those rights and freedom, by governmental restriction, to achieve the
same object. So the adjustment of the duties of the lawyer toward his
client and toward the court in the interest of society, are not always
easily distinguishable and an attempt to make them clear, therefore, is
justified.

An understanding between the client and his representative that
remuneration is a proper incident to their relation insures a greater
confidence in the activity and devotion of his lawyer to his interest on
the part of the client and stimulates industry and sincere effort on
the part of the lawyer. It is far better that the employment on a
pecuniary basis should be understood by all men, by the courts and by
the parties, than that some secret arrangements should exist unknown to
the court and the opposing party. But it is said that to give to
counsel, skilled, learned and familiar with the arts of advocacy and the
preparation of cases, a pecuniary motive to make the worse appear the
better reason, necessarily leads him to an attempt to influence the
court against a just result. For since one or the other conclusion must
be unjust, one of the paid attorneys arguing the cause before the court
must be arguing for the unjust side and in favor of wrong. Hence, it is
claimed, the system of paid advocacy must in every case tend to an
effort on one side or the other to pervert justice and mislead the
judges into inequity and wrong.

It may be agreed that if there were not certain limitations upon the
means which counsel may take to maintain the justice of their clients'
cause, if they were justified in suborning witnesses, and coaching them
to testify to an unfounded state of facts, if they were permitted to
misstate the evidence after it has been adduced, if it were regarded as
proper for them to accept employment in the prosecution of a cause wh