m the real issue.
I have recently heard an arraignment of our present judicial system in
the trial of causes by a prominent, able and experienced member of the
Boston Bar. (I am glad to call him a friend. I value him highly as
such.) He ascribes what he calls the growing lack of confidence in the
justice and equity of litigation in the courts to the fundamental error
in their procedure. He feels that the procedure now in vogue authorizes
and in fact requires counsel to withhold facts from the court which
would help the cause of justice if they were brought out by his own
statement. To remedy this he suggests that all counsel should be
compelled to disclose any facts communicated to them by their clients
which would require a decision of the case against the clients. He
contends further that the rules of procedure, which exclude hearsay
evidence, and prevent the jury from hearing many facts which business
men regard as important evidence, make it difficult to reach the truth
which is essential to justice.
I set out this view as a possible basis for a discussion of the grounds
for popular criticism of the courts. To require the counsel to disclose
the confidential communications of his client to the very court and jury
which are to pass on the issue which he is making, would end forever the
possibility of any useful relation between lawyer and client. It is
essential for the proper presentation of the client's cause that he
should be able to talk freely with his counsel without fear of
disclosure. This has always been recognized and has acted as a most
salutary restriction on the conduct of counsel. No litigants, or
intending litigants, would employ counsel if the latter were to assume
the duty of extracting from their clients all their innermost thoughts
with a view to revealing them to the court. The useful function of
lawyers is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it, where
possible, by advising settlement or withholding suit. Thus, any rule
that interfered with the complete disclosure of the client's inmost
thoughts on the issue he presents would seriously obstruct the peace
that is gained for society by the compromises which the counsel is able
to advise.
The objection to the exclusion of hearsay evidence is equally unfounded.
Its uses are said to be threefold, to convince in affairs of the world,
to serve as the basis of action for business men, and to prevent
opportunity for false witness. Yet it is n
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