e been based upon the expectation of an
uninterrupted market, are left in hopeless and critical suspense if
this market is suddenly removed, and it becomes apparent that to close
the Exchange is manifestly to inflict far-reaching hardship upon vast
numbers of people. It is also sure to be productive of much injustice.
In bad times sound and solvent firms are anxious to enforce all their
contracts promptly so as to protect themselves against those that are
overextended; an obligatory suspension of business compels these
solvent firms, in many cases, to help carry the risks of the insecure
ones and deprives the provident man of the safety to which he is
entitled.

When such facts as these are duly weighed by the agencies having the
authority to close the stock market, it becomes clear that duty
dictates a policy of hands off as long as a continuous market persists
and purchasers continue to buy as the decline proceeds. This was well
illustrated in the acute panic of 1907 when an enormous open market
never ceased to furnish the means by which needy sellers constantly
liquidated, and the possessors of savings made most profitable
investments. To have closed the Exchange during that crisis--assuming
it to have been possible--would have been an unmixed evil. The violent
decline in prices was the natural and only remedy for a long period of
over-speculation, and it would have been worse had it been
artificially postponed.

Considerations of this general character, up to July 30th, caused the
authorities of the New York Stock Exchange to take no action, although
the other world markets had all virtually suspended dealings. On July
30th, the evidences of approaching panic showed themselves. An
enormous business was done accompanied by very violent declines in
prices, and, although money was still obtainable throughout the day,
at the close of business profound uneasiness prevailed.

* * * * *

On the afternoon of July 30th, the officers of the Stock Exchange met
in consultation with a number of prominent bankers and bank
presidents, and the question of closing the Exchange was anxiously
discussed. While the news from abroad was most critical, and the day's
decline in prices was alarming, it was also true that no collapse had
taken place and no money panic had yet appeared. The bankers' opinion
was unanimous that while closing was a step that might become
necessary at any time, it was not clear