, and to control their
exercise. But, in spite of the blindness and rage of the beaten parties,
we have only to read the debates in the Chambers of 1815, and the
publications of the time, to be convinced that at that epoch liberty was
far from having entirely perished; and the history of the ministers who
were then in power unanswerably demonstrates that they sustained the
weight of a most effective responsibility.

Of the two temporary bills introduced into the Chamber in 1815, that
respecting the prevotal courts met with the least opposition. Two very
superior men, MM. Royer-Collard and Cuvier, had consented to become its
official advocates, in the character of Royal Commissioners; and during
the discussion, M. Cuvier took the lead. The debate was a very short
one; two hundred and ninety members voted for the bill, ten only
rejected it. The division may create surprise. The bill, in principle,
comprised the heaviest possible infringement on common right, and the
most formidable in practical application, by the suppression, in these
courts, of the greater part of the privileges accorded in the ordinary
modes of jurisdiction. A clause in the bill went almost to deprive the
King of his prerogative of pardon, by ordering the immediate execution
of the condemned criminals, unless the prevotal court itself assumed the
functions of grace by recommending them to royal clemency. One of
the most enthusiastic Royalists of the right-hand party,
M. Hyde de Neuville, objected energetically, but without effect, to a
clause so harsh and anti-monarchical. The two most intractable of
passions, anger and fear, prevailed in the Chamber; it had its own
cause, as well as that of the King, to defend and avenge, and persuaded
itself that it could neither strike too soon nor too strongly when both
were attacked.

On this occasion, as well as on others, the memory of M. Cuvier has been
unjustly treated. He has been accused of pusillanimity and servile
ambition. The charge indicates little knowledge of human nature, and
insults a man of genius on very slight grounds. I lived much with
M. Cuvier. Firmness in mind and action was not his most prominent
quality; but he was neither servile, nor governed by fear in opposition
to his conscience. He loved order, partly for his own personal security,
but much more for the cause of justice, civilization, the advantage of
society, and the progress of intellect. In his complaisance for power,
he was more