, if
there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the
will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing
what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some
circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result
being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that
circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution,
may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots
an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness
simply.

From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the
first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know.
The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain
extent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is
concomitant with the act of the will.
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QUESTION 7

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is a circumstance?

(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of
human acts?

(3) How many circumstances are there?

(4) Which are the most important of them?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]

Whether a Circumstance Is an Accident of a Human Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of
a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a
circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and
strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived
principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as
the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also
Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a
circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

Obj. 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which
surrounds (_circumstat_) is rather out than in. Therefore the
circumstances are not accidents of human acts.

Obj. 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts
themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not
accidents of acts.

_On the contrary,_ The particular conditions of any singular thing
are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [*_ta kath'
ekasta_], i.e. the particular conditi