ionate to an end
by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the
circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts
according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and
this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on
(Q. 18, AA. 10, 11; Q. 73, A. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian
considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be
voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above
(Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this
implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in
the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to
that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which
is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and
"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the
goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing
hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion
to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected
by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such
like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to
the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being
related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.

Reply Obj. 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the
moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far
as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue
in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in
so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of
excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the
orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this
consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all
the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and
vicious acts, just as the